The Quebec Question: Something Old, Something New

When Stephen Harper announced that he intended to introduce a motion in the House of Commons declaring that Quebec constituted a nation within Canada, this seemingly profound gesture was more about political tactics that about setting right historic wrongs. Harper deftly inserted himself between the Bloc Quebecois and a divided Liberal party on the eve on its leadership convention with his sudden initiative.

What set the dominoes falling in the first place was the position adopted by Michael Ignatieff that the way to resolve the Quebec question was with the formula: “Quebec is my nation; Canada is my country.” To this the Bloc responded with its own initiative---a Commons resolution to declare that Quebec was a nation tout court. Ignatieff’s maladroitly handled foray on the Quebec question led to an effective riposte from leadership rival Bob Rae. When Ignatieff, who has an unerring eye for the maladroit, warned that Canada could face civil war unless the Quebec question was resolved, Rae had him. Only someone who was not around for the Meech Lake and Charlottetown melodramas would reopen this can of worms, said Rae, who presents himself as the man of experience and reasoned calm.

Now Harper has landed the Liberals in a quagmire, or has he? He has forced the Liberals (with a few possible dissenters), as well as the Bloc and the NDP to support his motion. When the Liberals vote for the resolution recognizing Quebec as a nation on Monday, they will concede a tactical victory to Harper. If they had refused, they would have offended the large majority of Quebecers---with their National Assembly and national capital region (around Quebec City)---who have long thought of themselves as constituting a nation.

And what are the Liberals to do when they get to Montreal with the resolution advanced by the Ignatieff camp that would embed the recognition of Quebec as a nation in the constitution, when the conditions for this permit, something the Harper resolution decidedly does not do?

Before assessing the significance of all this, we need to take a brief journey through history to review the evolution of this thorny question.

The idea that French Canadians or Quebecers (both notions were advanced) constitute a nation has a very long pedigree. It had been around for decades by the time the Quiet Revolution got underway in Quebec in the 1960s. The question was transformed during the sixties, a time when nations in Africa and elsewhere were throwing off the chains of colonialism and establishing sovereign states---so that, in theory at least, they would no longer be ruled by the old imperial powers. With the Union Nationale regime out of the way, young Quebec nationalists were proclaiming that Quebec was just as much a nation---with its shared history, common culture, religion and large territory---as the newly independent states that were making their debut.

Many were inspired by the recent Cuban Revolution. I remember student leaders, at the time, who displayed maps of Cuba on the walls of their offices. “If Cuba can do it, why not Quebec with its higher level of development, vaster resources and ample territory?” they asked rhetorically.

From this point, federal political parties tried placing a toe in these frigid waters.

The first federal party to state that Canada was a country made up of “two founding nations” was the NDP at its inaugural convention in Ottawa in 1961. The term “nation” it was carefully explained, was used in a sociological sense, in accordance with the meaning of the French word nation to convey the idea that French speakers in Canada constituted a people. The NDP took this step in the early days of the Quiet Revolution. The gesture was somewhat costly politically. A few distinguished social democrats, long time members of the CCF, such as Eugene Forsey, were so annoyed that they refused to join the fledgling NDP.

After Robert Stanfield became federal Conservative leader in 1967, his party took tentative steps, as well, to declare that Canada was composed of two nations.

What was significant was that both these attempts to recognize the national character of the French fact in Canada---unclear though they were about whether these propositions referred to French Canada as a whole or to Quebec---came from political parties overwhelmingly based in English Canada. These well meaning attempts to reach an understanding with Quebec nationalists were stopped dead in their tracks by the rise of the personality who dominated the era---Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

When Trudeau entered federal politics, he brought with him his deep-seated disdain for nationalism. His interpretation of modern history was that the idea that as a consequence of their unique personalities (cultures), nations have the right to self-determination was the root of much of the world’s misery.

What Quebec needed, he insisted, was the development of the capacities of individual Quebecers. Through education, enterprise and a mastery of technology, Quebecers would make themselves a force to be reckoned with across Canada. Their achievements would win them power in Ottawa in addition to the power they already had in Quebec City and would assure the survival of their language and culture. Quebec had no need of special recognition as the homeland of a nation, he argued. He held solidly to this position in power and out. After leaving office, he railed against the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, deploring any arrangement that would bestow “distinct society” status on Quebec.

While Trudeau’s position never won over more than a few politicians in provincial politics in Quebec, it had a decisive impact in English Canada. His insistence that all provinces must be treated alike and that none had more importance than any other in its role in guaranteeing the linguistic and cultural rights of Francophones won easy ascendancy in English Canada. After all, here was a Quebecer who was keeping Quebec in its place. Trudeau’s new constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms took deeper root in English Canada than in Quebec and when he died he was mourned more deeply in Ontario than in Quebec.

Great though his influence was, Trudeau could not will the Quebec national question away. The insistence that Quebec must be accorded recognition for its collective character, its national character, has remained. A few Francophones like Stephane Dion, the author of the Clarity Act, clung to the Trudeau mantra, notwithstanding Dion’s decision to vote for Harper’s motion. For the rest, federalists or sovereignists, recognition of Quebec as a nation is desired, for the former to win soft nationalists to the federal cause, for the latter as a stepping stone to sovereignty.

Michael Ignatieff must be credited with having revisited a question that endures, while being reproached for having done it badly. For his part, the emptiness of Stephen Harper’s gesture is revealed in the fact that his resolution is like the Cheshire Cat, Quebec gets nothing from it but the smile. The moment Harper offered something substantial to Quebec, his political base in Alberta would rise in condemnation.

The worst thing about the historical legacy of Pierre Trudeau was to convince English Canadians that they need not trouble themselves with the Quebec question. For that reason, at least, the resolution with a smile is worth passing. With genuine recognition of Quebec as a nation, which must come one day, Canada can and will survive, but as a country made up not only of individuals, but also of collectivities, of which Quebec is one. Canadians have nothing to fear from embracing the deep diversity that has always characterized their country.